ओ.न.जी.सी. प्रशा. उरण
ONGC ADMN, URAN
Inward No. 964
Date 17/12/25

OIL & NATURAL GAS CORPORATION (W.O.U.) KARMACHARI SANGHATANA

AFFILIATED TO - PETROLIUM & GAS WORKERS' FEDERATION OF INDIA

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Website : www.ksmumbai.com

REF. : ONGC/KS/ 111 /2025 DATE : 15/12/2025

To,
The CGM - Plant Manager,
ONGC-WOU,
Dronagiri Bhavan,
LPG Plant,Uran,
Dist. Raigad – 400 702.

o/c

Subject: Safety Complaints & Operational Lapses in Boiler Operations at ONGC, Uran Co.generation Plant.

Respected Sir,
We have received a complaint letter from our employees working at Co.Generation Plant. regarding numerous critical safety & operational issues in the boiler & cogeneration operations at the ONGC Uran Cogeneration Plant. These issues, raised by our boiler operator members, pose serious risks to personnel safety & plant equipment, & they appear to violate provisions of the Indian Boilers Act, 1923 & the Indian Boiler Regulations (IBR), 1950. We urge immediate corrective action on the points detailed below.

Key Safety & Operational Concerns

1. **Insufficient Manpower Allocation:**

   The current staffing of boiler operations is grossly inadequate. Only **two operators are managing all running boilers** & **two operators cover the APU DM Plant** per shift, which is far below safe norms. High-capacity boilers require multiple trained operators; a single operator cannot simultaneously monitor Furnace conditions, Feed water, Steam parameters, Large size main steam stop valve, Isolation valve & respond to emergencies. This shortage is especially dangerous during emergencies like power blackouts or boiler trips, when timely & coordinated action is critical. The **Boiler Attendants Rules** (and general industry practice) mandate that certified operators always be present for each boiler in operation. Our union considers the present manpower level unacceptable, & we emphasize that it **must** be increased to ensure compliance with safety standards & to protect life & property.

2. **Absence of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs):**

   There are no written SOPs provided for the startup, shutdown, routine operation, & emergency handling of the boilers & demineralization (DM) plants (both the cogeneration DM plant & the APU DM plant).

Contd....2

This is a **serious safety gap**. Formal, written SOPs are essential so that all operators follow correct procedures uniformly, especially during critical situations like **Blackouts, Power Failures, Unit Trippings, Instrument Air Failures or Steam Line Hammering & Return Condensate Line, Tank Hammering**. The lack of documented procedures is against best practices in the industry & may violate internal safety & quality management requirements. Clear SOPs (covering roles/responsibilities, step-by-step actions & communication protocols for normal & emergency scenarios) must be issued to all operating staff without further delay.

During a blackout, boiler operators are often required to prioritize assisting with gas turbine (GT) revival and electrical system restoration including breakers and main supply panels over their primary boiler operations. This shift in focus leads to operational delays and increases overall risk exposure.

We must emphasize that involvement in GT and electrical activities falls outside the scope of boiler operators' responsibilities and poses significant safety risks, as evidenced by a recent accident in the electrical department. Therefore, we clearly state that boiler operators will not participate in such activities.

Severe and continuous hammering is occurring in the return condensate tank due to the entry of extremely high-temperature condensate accompanied by steam. A critical design flaw the connection of the condensate line at the bottom of the tank is causing intense pressure shocks and turbulence. This condition presents serious safety hazards, including the risk of tank rupture, pipeline failure and the sudden release of scalding steam or hot condensate, creating a highly dangerous environment for both personnel and equipment.

During the recent blackout, a total power failure caused all electrical systems to trip, resulting in the **GD (Guillotine Damper)** and **DD (Diverted Damper)** panels losing supply. The feed pump tripped due to the power loss; however, the DD remained open to the boiler, causing the boiler drum level to drop and remain in a dry-out condition for over 45 minutes.

Despite the GT operating in **Full Speed No Load (FSNL) mode**, our repeated requests to shut it down in accordance with standard safety protocols were ignored by the shift in-charge and Cogen Management. The GT must be stopped immediately in the event of a low drum level in the boiler.

The boiler operators have repeatedly informed Cogen Management about tube failures and equipment damage. Unfortunately, no action has been taken to replace the damaged tubes or equipment.

3. Overloading of HRSG-4 Boiler Beyond Design Capacity:

The Heat Recovery Steam Generator **HRSG-4** is consistently being operated at **65–66 TPH (tons per hour)** steam generation, despite its design capacity being **60 TPH**. This **overloading beyond 100% capacity** is extremely unsafe, it overstresses boiler pressure parts & could precipitate failures. Operating a boiler above its Maximum Continuous Rating undermines the safety margins that were intended by design.

Contd....3

In fact, **Regulations 390–399 of the Indian Boiler Regulations, 1950 cover the required stress calculations & safety factors for boiler pressure parts**. Exceeding the rated output of HRSG-4 violates the spirit of these safety factor provisions & **must be stopped immediately** to prevent catastrophic damage (such as tube rupture or leakage). The HRSG-4 boiler has been brought online despite numerous outstanding punch points and unresolved safety issues.

4. **No "Buddy System" in High-Risk Zones:**

   It has been observed that a **buddy system is not implemented** for operators working in high-risk areas such as inside boiler drums or confined spaces & boiler & Deaerator floors. Standard safety practice (including **American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)** guidelines) clearly states that "examination inside boilers should be of the **'Buddy System'** type" no person should enter a confined or dangerous space alone without another person standing by for assistance. Despite the boiler area being classified as a high-risk zone, management has been allowing single operators to work alone during critical tasks. **This negligence is unacceptable as it endangers human life.** We insist that a two-person buddy system be immediately enforced for all hazardous operations & regular operation (e.g. confined space entry, handling of chemicals, boiler startup, shutdown etc.) to comply with basic safety protocols & to protect our workers.

5. **Coercive & Unsafe Boiler Startup Practices:**

   It is reported that management & shift in-charges are **pressuring boiler operators & Proficiency (BOE) contractual engineers to accelerate boiler start-up sequences** beyond safe limits. Specifically, operators are being verbally coerced to initiate & ramp up boilers on an **"excessively constrained timeframe"**, bypassing or shortening critical warm-up & purging steps. This is a **severe safety violation** skipping prescribed warm-up protocols can cause dangerous thermal stress, potentially leading to **tube leaks or ruptures** due to uneven heating. Forcing start-ups at such unsafe speeds contravenes all standard operating norms for boilers. We demand that this practice cease immediately. Boiler light-up & loading must be done strictly as per recommended procedure & only when all safety interlocks are verified, without any intimidation or undue haste imposed on operating staff.

Defective Boiler Instruments & Equipment:

Multiple essential boiler instruments & components are in **defective condition**, compromising safe operations.

6. **Drum Level Indicators:**

   At least one boiler (the Thermax package boiler in the APU) currently has **both its glass gauge level indicators non-functional** (one gauge glass is broken & leaking & the other is so clouded that it's unreadable). Moreover, even the **electronic drum level indicator is malfunctioning**, leaving the operator with only a single transmitter reading for drum water level. This lack of a reliable, redundant indication of drum level is extremely dangerous loss of proper level indication can lead to a boiler running dry or overflowing without the operator's knowledge.

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Operating a boiler under such conditions may violate Section 8 of the Indian Boilers Act, 1923, which stipulates that a boiler's certificate is void if the boiler has any accident or unsafe condition until it is properly repaired & certified. Running a boiler with inoperative level gauges arguably falls under an unsafe condition requiring immediate rectification.

Heavy steam leakage from the isolation valve flange gasket on the **APU Thermax Boiler's** main steam line can result in significant steam loss, reduced operational efficiency, and pose serious safety hazards.

7. Critical Valves & Traps:

Several critical valves are not functioning as they should. For instance, on **HRSG-1 & HRSG-2** the **main steam stop valves, start-up vent valves, & continuous blowdown (CBD) motor-operated valves are not operating properly**, forcing manual intervention & creating operational hazards. Additionally, **many steam traps within the cogeneration unit are clogged or failed** & thus not removing condensate. This leads to condensate accumulation, severe **steam hammering** in lines & increased risk of **leaks or pipe rupture**. All such faulty valves & traps need urgent maintenance or replacement.

8. Divert Damper & Interlocks:

The **diverter dampers** (which redirect gas flow in HRSGs) have **non-functional interlocks with the boiler protection system**. Notably, the interlock that should trip the boiler or divert flue gas upon a **low boiler drum water level** in HRSG-1, 2 & 3 is not working. In a low-water scenario, if the boiler does not trip or the exhaust gas flow isn't diverted, the HRSG could continue firing with insufficient water, leading to **overheating of tubes (dry-out)** & potentially catastrophic tube failures. This is an extremely critical safety issue a basic fail-safe intended to prevent boiler dry-fire is inoperative. It requires immediate fixing & thorough testing.

10. Structural Safety of HRSG-3 Deaerator Building:

The structural support platform/building of the **HRSG-3 deaerator** is in an unsafe condition the floor grating & structural members are **severely corroded & damaged**. This creates a hazard for anyone working or walking in that area, as the structure could give way. It also calls into question the support integrity for the deaerator itself (a heavy vessel).Continuing operations around a structurally unsound platform is against basic safety norms. This structure needs to be repaired or reinforced on priority to prevent an accident (collapse or fall injury).

11. Understaffing & Safety at APU DM Plant:

The **APU DM Water Plant**, which is about 1 km away from the main control room & had a serious accident in 2019, is currently manned by just **one operator per shift**. On many occasions, this is woefully inadequate given the hazardous chemicals involved such as hydrochloric acid and caustic soda used in resin regeneration & the remote location, which delays access to help.

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The lone operator must often handle strong chemicals & manage the plant equipment solo, which violates the **buddy system principle** & puts the operator at high risk if any incident occurs.

Frequent and unplanned changes to boiler operators' duty assignments between the boiler area and the APU DM plant within a single shift present serious safety concerns. These irregular transitions reduce situational awareness, increase operator fatigue, and elevate the risk of errors in two critical process areas.

To ensure safe and reliable operations, duty assignments must be stable and clearly defined. Operators should not be transferred arbitrarily between departments, as doing so undermines both personnel safety and overall plant integrity.

We insist that this area be always staffed with at least two persons & that proper safety gear & procedures (for chemical handling & emergency response) be in place.

The above points illustrate a pattern of serious neglect of safety protocols & regulatory compliance at the plant. We remind you that the **Indian Boilers Act, 1923** & **IBR 1950** exist to prevent exactly such scenarios that endanger life & equipment. For instance, under **Section 8 of the Boilers Act, any boiler that has undergone an accident or unsafe alteration cannot be operated until a renewed certificate is issued after thorough inspection**. **Section 9** of the Act permits only a provisional use of a boiler under strict Inspector oversight in special cases, not continuous running with unresolved defects. Furthermore, **Section 34 of the Act stipulates that no boiler is exempt from these safety laws unless a specific official exemption is granted by the State Government** to our knowledge, no such exemption exists for ONGC Uran. This means **all** the above requirements & safety conditions are fully applicable to our boilers & must be adhered to.

It is also pertinent to mention here that **Regulation 390 of the Indian Boiler Regulations (IBR), 1950** outlines the mandatory periodic thorough examinations of boilers (internal & external) to ensure their safe working condition.

Strict Compliance with Boiler Laws:

The plant management must commit to full compliance with the **Indian Boilers Act, 1923** & the **Indian Boiler Regulations, 1950**. No **boiler should be operated in contravention of Sections 8 & 9 of the Act,** meaning if any boiler has had an accident, undergone unsafe modifications, or has expired certification, it must be shut down & re-certified before use. All periodic inspections & tests mandated by the Act/Regulations (annual inspections, safety valve testing, thickness checks, etc.) should be up to date. We specifically expect compliance with **Section 34 of the Act**, i.e., unless a valid exemption is granted (which is not the case here), **all provisions of the Act & IBR apply in entirety to ONGC's boilers**. The management should liaise with the Directorate of Boilers to immediately address any outstanding non-compliances. We also request compliance with any relevant **Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD)** guidelines that apply to cogeneration & boiler facilities.

Contd....6

Each of the above demands addresses a **non-negotiable safety requirement**. We trust you will agree that the lives of workers & the integrity of valuable equipment are at stake. As such, we expect **prompt & tangible remedial action**. We request you to provide a written action plan & to begin implementing fixes **within 15 working days** of this letter. This timeframe is reasonable & in line with the urgency these issues warrant.

Please note that we have enclosed relevant data as annexures to support our complaint. **Annexure I** provides technical details of each boiler (capacity, registration number, design parameters) as well as a list of known pending safety issues for reference & **Annexure II** contains detailed information on the current boiler operating staff deployment. These documents substantiate the points raised & should assist in planning the necessary remedial measures.

We urges the ONGC Uran Co.generation Plant management to treat this matter with the utmost seriousness & urgency. We are committed to working collaboratively to improve safety; however, if adequate steps are not initiated within 15 working days, we will have no choice but to consider escalating these concerns to higher authorities, including ONGC's corporate management & the relevant statutory bodies (such as the **Director of Steam Boilers, Chief Maharashtra State & Dy. Director of Steam Boilers, Divisional Inspector of Boiler**), as provided under the law. We sincerely hope that will not be necessary & that you will resolve these issues immediately in the interest of worker safety, legal compliance & reliable plant operation.

We look forward to your positive & swift action on all the above points.

Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,

(Pradeep Mayekar)
General Secretary

Copy to:

1.CGM (P) - Head Operations, ONGC-WOU, Dronagiri Bhavan, Uran Plant, Uran
2.CGM (E) - Head HSE, ONGC-WOU, Dronagiri Bhavan, Uran Plant, Uran
3.CGM (M) - Head Maintenance, ONGC-WOU, Dronagiri Bhavan, Uran Plant,Uran
4.CGM (I) - Head Engineering Services, ONGC-WOU,Engg. Services,Uran Plant
5.GM (HR) - Incharge HR/ER, ONGC-WOU, Dronagiri Bhavan, Uran Plant, Uran
6.GM (E) – Area Manager (Electrical),ONGC-WOU,Dronagiri Bhavan,Uran Plant,Uran
7.Manager (HR) - I/c IR, ONGC-WOU, Dronagiri Bhavan, Uran Plant, Uran

DATE: 05.12.2025

To,
GENERAL SECRETARY,
ONGC (W.O.U.) KARMACHARI SANGATHANA.
FIRST FLOOR, NBP GREEN HEIGHTS,
BKC, BANDRA (EAST), MUMBAI 400051 INDIA

SUBJECT: CRITICAL SAFETY CONCERNS AND REQUEST FOR REVISION OF MANPOWER ALLOCATION.

Respected Sir,

We, the Boiler Operators of ONGC URAN COGENERATION PLANT, bring to your attention critical safety concerns that pose significant risks to personnel and equipment. the current minimum manpower allocation of four (4) personnel per shift (2 operators for all boilers and 2 operators for APU DM Plant) is grossly inadequate to ensure the safe and efficient operation of the cogeneration plant. To maintain compliance with safety standards, operational reliability, and readiness during emergencies, we request that the manpower allocation be revised as follows:

- Boiler Operations: 2 boiler operators per running boiler (Total: 4 operators for 2 running boilers)
- DA/DM Plant & Standby Boilers: 1 dedicated boiler operators
- APU DM Plant: 2 boiler operators.

CRITICAL SAFETY CONCERN: -

We would like to bring to your attention the following safety concerns: -

- No "Buddy System" is implemented in Boilers despite being classified as a High-Risk Zone. This negligence is unacceptable and endangers human life.

- The current Minimum manpower maintained by the management in the Boiler department (All Boilers, Cogen DA/DM Plant and APU DM Plant Running and Standby Condition) is inadequate. This shortage poses significant risks during emergency situations (Blackout and Boiler trip), where timely and effective responses are crucial.

- Management and the Shift Incharge are reportedly **verbally coercing** boiler operators and contract Proficiency Engineers to initiate boiler startup sequences within an **excessively constrained timeframe.** This directive constitutes a severe safety violation by bypassing necessary warm-up protocols, substantially increasing the risk of catastrophic events like **tube bursting or leakages**.

- In blackout, boiler operators are required to Prioritize Helping in gas turbine revival and electrical system. restoration (including breakers and main supply panels) over boiler operations, leading to delays and increased risk exposure. We emphasize that assisting with GT and electrical activities is outside our scope and poses significant safety risks, as highlighted by a recent electrical department accident. We clearly state that we will not engage in such activities.

- **There is NO SOP given for All boilers and DA/DM & APU DM plant and lack of knowledge of IBR rule in COGEN Management:** Need SOPs for the all boiler, DA/DM plant, and APU DM plant **Operation, Start-Up, Stop-Down, Blackout, Power Failure, Unit Tripping, Instrument Air Failure, Hammering in Steam and Condensate Pipeline. (a) Number of Personnel Required:** Identify the minimum number of personnel needed for each emergency scenario. **(b)Assigned Roles and Responsibilities:** Clearly define who does what **(c)Sequential Actions:** Outline precise, step-by-step actions to be taken by each person, including communication protocols.

- HRSG-4 BOILER: Overloading of HRSG-4 boiler is being operated beyond its designed capacity of 60 TPH, consistently producing 65-66 TPH. This overloading exceeds design limits, posing significant risks to boiler integrity and operational safety.

- HRSG-4 BOILER: Many Punch Points and Safety points Requirements are Pending but Boiler are Taken Online.

- Understaffing at APU DM Plant in accident-prone area: The APU DM Plant, located approximately 1 km from the Cogen control room and situated in an accident-prone area (2019), is manned by only one operator per shift. This is insufficient for critical safety concern, and personal safety. Buddy System is not followed. Chemical HCL (Hydrochloric acid) NaOH (Caustic soda) handling while regeneration.

- HRSG-3 deaerator building structure is severely damaged: The floor grading of the deaerator building structure is severely damaged and heavily rusted, posing a serious hazard to personnel walking in the area. Immediate action is required to prevent potential injuries.

- Failure of the Diverted Damper Interlock with boiler tripping on low water level in HRSG 1,2&3 is a critical issue that could lead to boiler dry-out, can result in severe consequences, including overheating of tubes, thermal stress, and potential tube failure. Prolonged dry-out may cause warping, cracking, or even catastrophic damage to boiler components causing severe damage and operational risks.

- HRSG 1&2 Main Steam Stop Valve, startup Vents Valve, CBD MOV is not operating is essential to preventing manual handling risks and operational hazards.

- There are multiple steam traps within the Cogen Battery Limit that are not working. This poses a significant safety hazard, potentially leading to hammering, may result into line leakage, valve and flange damage, and safety risks.

- **APU Thermax Boiler: (a) Both the Drum Level gauge glasses on the boiler are non-functional** – one is broken and leaking, while the other is obscured and unreadable. Additionally, **(b) electronic drum level indicator is also not working properly**. As a result, operators are being forced to rely solely on the drum level transmitter for monitoring boiler water levels, which potentially lead to hazardous situations **(c) heavy steam leakage** in the isolation valve flange gasket of the main steam line can be serious, leading to steam loss, reduced efficiency, and safety risks.

ANNEXURE-I

ONGC URAN COGENERATION PLANT BOILERS DETAILS: -

SR. NO.	NAME	REGISTRATION NUMBER	MAXIMUM EVAPORATION CAPACITY AND TYPE	MAXIMUM WORKING PRESSURE	HEATING SURFACE AREA
1.	HRSG-1	MR-10915	**75 TPH** WATER TUBE BOILER (HRSG WITH SF)	14.60 Kg/cm²	10091 sq. mtr.
2.	HRSG-2	MR-10960	**75 TPH** WATER TUBE BOILER (HRSG WITH SF)	14.60 Kg/cm²	10091 sq. mtr.
3.	HRSG-3	MR-13052	**90 TPH** WATER TUBE BOILER (HRSG WITH SF)	16.00 Kg/cm²	20815 sq. mtr.
4.	APU THERMAX	MR-15553	**99 TPH** WATER TUBE BOILER (GAS FIRED)	21.00 Kg/cm²	4043 sq. mtr.
5.	HRSG-4	MR-19045	**60 TPH** WATER TUBE BOILER (HRSG WITH SF)	20.00 Kg/cm²	20163 sq. mtr.

ONGC URAN WATER TREATMENT PLANT'S FOR BOILER'S DETAILS: -

SR. NO.	NAME	CAPACITY	LOCATION
1.	OLD DA/DM PLANT	60 m³	COGEN PLANT
2.	APU DM PLANT	75 m³	NEAR PLANT CANTEEN (1 Km. APPROX. DISTANCE FROM COGEN PLANT)

ANNEXURE – II

BOILER OPERATOR MANPOWER DETAILS: -

SR.NO.	NAME	CPF NO.	DESIGNATION	IBR CERTIFACTION
1.	GAUTAM U. KADAM	93005	A.F/M (B)	FIRST CLASS
2.	UTTAM N. PAWAR	93006	A.F/M (B)	FIRST CLASS
3.	SHAMIR Y. MHASKE	93007	A.F/M (B)	SECOND CLASS
4.	VIVEK K. PATIL	126536	T(B)	FIRST CLASS
5.	NELSON L. KOLI	126538	T(B)	FIRST CLASS
6.	NILESH V. MHATRE	126564	T(B)	FIRST CLASS
7.	SUNIL G. VANAGE	126563	T(B)	FIRST CLASS
8.	SANJAY R. PISE	126537	T(B)	FIRST CLASS
9.	PRAKASH N. KOTHAVALE	126580	T(B)	FIRST CLASS
10.	SANJAY N. PATIL	126539	T(B)	FIRST CLASS
11.	SHANTARAM V. DEVRE	92852	DE	FIRST CLASS
12.	SUDHIR D. TAMBE	92859	DE	FIRST CLASS
13.	DEEPAK J. KOLI	92866	DE	FIRST CLASS
14.	SANTOSH A. MHATRE	92863	DE	FIRST CLASS
15.	RAJESH H. PATIL	126566	T(B)	FIRST CLASS
16.	SHIRISH S. SHRESHTHI	135245	EA(B)	FIRST CLASS
17.	BHAJANLAL	135143	EA(B)	FIRST CLASS
18.	NITESH N. CHOULKAR	127668	SEA(B)	FIRST CLASS
19.	SHUBHAM S. KADAM	141324	JEA(B)	FIRST CLASS
20.	SACHIN B. LENDVE	141584	JEA(B)	FIRST CLASS
21.	RITESH P. INGOLE	126650	T(B)	FIRST CLASS
22.	MUKESH M. DAY	126509	T(B)	FIRST CLASS
23.	MUKUL R. MISAL	126598	T(B)	FIRST CLASS
24.	RAKESH S. PATIL	126524	T(B)	SECOND CLASS
25.	PRAKASH G. TARDE	130647	DT(B)	SECOND CLASS
26.	ASHISH F. MUNGMUDE	141287	JT(B)	FIRST CLASS
27.	CHANDAN Y. KHEKARE	140560	JT(B)	FIRST CLASS

These issues collectively create unsafe working conditions and increase the likelihood of operational failures, safety incidents, equipment damage and a major Humam Safety Hazard.

We earnestly request your intervention and support in implementing this revised manpower structure at the earliest to safeguard personnel, equipment integrity, and uninterrupted plant operations.

Thank you for your attention to these pressing concerns.

BOILER OPERATORS,
ONGC URAN, COGENERATION PLANT.

NAME	GPF NO.	DESIGNATION	SIGN
S.Y. Maske	93007	F.Man	Smaske
C.Y. kekare	140560	J.T (B)	CYKe
S.R. Pise	126537	T (B)	Spise
V.N. Pawar	9300	F. Man	
R.S. Patil	1265	Tech. (B)	
S.G. Vanage	126563	Tech (B)	Svanage
S.S. Shreshthi	135245	A E (B)	
P.M. Khothawale	126581	Tech. (B)	P.M.Kothavale
P.G. Tarde	130647	JE&H (B)	
M.R. Misd	126598	Tech (B)	Misd
D. J. Koli	92866	D.E.(B).	
S.S. Kadam	141324	JEA (B)	
S.V. Deree	92852	DE (B)	
S.N. Patil	126539	Tec (B)	
N.N. Chaulkar	127668	SEA (B)	
R.P. INGOLE	126650	Tech (B)	
M.M. Day	126509	Tech (B)	

	NAME	CPF NO.	DESIGNATION	SIGN
*	N.L. KOLI —	126538	TECH (B) →	
*	A. F. Mungmode —	141287	J.T. (B.) →	Amungmode
**	BHAJAN LAL -	135143	E A (B) →	
**	S.D. TAMBE. —	92859	DE (B) →	Stambe
*	R.H. Patil.	126566	Tech (B)	Patil.
	N.V. MHATRE	126564	Tech (B)	

Date: 04.09.2025

To,

Boiler Proficiency Engineers (BPEs)

A,B,C,D Shifts, Cogen C/R

Uran Plant, ONGC Uran

(Through Shift Incharge)

Subject: Smooth Operation of Boilers, Cogen DA/DM Plant, and APU DM Plant

Dear Team,

Each shift comprises 2 Boiler Proficiency Engineers (BPEs), 5 Boiler Operators at the Cogen Plant, and 1 Boiler Operator at the APU DM Plant. For the effective operation of two boilers, the Cogen DA Plant, and the APU DM Plant, a minimum manpower of **2 BPEs and 4 Boiler Operators** must be maintained at all times.

Key operational guidelines:

- The APU DM Plant water should be lined up to the boiler for the maximum possible duration throughout the day.
- During the regeneration of the APU DM Plant or any operational issues, the Cogen DA Plant water must be lined up to the boiler.
- A minimum of **2 operators** must be maintained at the APU DM Plant in all shifts (Morning/Evening/Night).
- One operator from the Cogen Plant will be sent to the APU DM Plant on an alternating basis (2 cycles) to maintain this minimum.
- BPEs will ensure the presence of Boiler Operators at their designated locations at all times.
- No operator shall leave the site without explicit permission from the Shift In-Charge (I/C) and the BPE.
- BPEs are also responsible for ensuring that the water parameters of the Cogen DA Plant, APU DM Plant, and Boiler Feed Water are maintained as per the **Maharashtra Boiler Rules, 1962**, and ONGC's standard parameter limits.
- BPEs will ensure Coordination, operation and necessary corrective action to be taken to maintain the health of Boilers/HRSGs at Cogen Plant.

04/09/2025

Your cooperation and strict adherence to these guidelines are essential for safe and smooth operations.
Thank you for your attention.

Regards

04/09/2025

Naresh Kumar G Patel
DGM(E), Cogen E/M
Uran Plant

Encl. 1) Scope of Work of BPE Contract.

Copy to:

1) Global S.S Construction ltd
2) GM(E)-AM(Electrical)
3) A,B,C,D Cogen C/R Shift I/Cs
4) SE(E)- Cogen E/M

other log books like water reports etc. as per the practice in vogue, and as modified from time to time.

10) All chemicals, consumable air, water, electricity and fuel gas for boilers etc. will be provided by ONGC free of cost. The consumption record keeping and timely requirement generation shall be in the scope of contractor/ deputed BPE.

11) For operation of Boiler qualified personals are to be deployed to satisfy the requirement as per Maharashtra Boiler Act 1923 and The Maharashtra Boiler Rule-1962 or any other statutory rules/act related to safe operation of Boilers.

12) The Boiler Proficiency Engineers once deployed for Operations of Boilers shall continue i.e. normally the change of persons should not be done. However, in emergency cases written approval of Engineer-in-charge should be taken for changing any person meeting the entire requirement as mentioned in special conditions.

13) Contractor shall deploy suitable person who shall coordinate various activities with the Engineer-in-charge such as but not limited to gate pass formalities, attendance monitoring as well as deployment, completion of payment formalities etc. No extra payment shall be made for the supervision and rates shall be deemed to be included in such work.

14) The contractor will be liable for the discipline and goods behaviour of all the BPE's engaged by him and in case of any complaints being received against any of his personnel he shall arrange to replace such persons within 24 hours of receiving such notice.

15) The contractor shall not employ or permit to be employed any person suffering from any contagious, loathsome or infectious disease. The contractor shall get examined his employees/workers through a Govt. doctor/Registered practitioner and produce the fitness certificate before deployment.

16) The contractor has to comply and adhere with the fire prevention, safety rules, regulations and policies of the company. The contractor shall provide cotton overall safety shoes, safety helmet and other required personal protective equipments to the personnel so deployed at site. All these Kits item shall conform to relevant IS specifications or equivalent, where ever applicable.

17) No employee or person of contractor (including contractor) is allowed to consume alcoholic drinks or narcotics drinks or any narcotics within the plant prtemises. If found under the influence of above, the contractor shall have to change/replace him failing which ONGC may terminate the contract.

18) The contractor should produce the police verification of the character and anteceedents of workers to be deployed by him. In case any worker is found having criminal record, he shall have to be immediately replaced without assigning any reasons.

19) Two BPE are required to be posted in each of the shifts, operating on three shift/day pattern on round the clock basis. Thus there will be four shifts, consisting of two BPE in each shift totalling eight (08) nos. of BPE's. **The contractor has to ensure the availability of eight (08) nos. of BPE's on its roll for posting in shifts as per the requirement of ONGC.** Contractor will be required to deploy two BPE per shift, in the four shifts.

20) Technical specifications :

a. **HRSG-I & II BOILERS & BOILER EQUIPMENTS**

Two nos. of 75T/Hr, 14.5 Kg/cm2 BHEL make gas fired water tube type Heat recovery steam generator. It consists of three nos. of boiler feed water pumps common to both boilers. One no. of forced draft fan for each boiler. Both are DCS Operated boilers. (HRSG 1-MR 10915, HRSG2-MR 10960)

b **HRSG-III BOILER**

One no. of 90T/Hr, 16.5 Kg/cm2 BHEL make gas fired single drum water tube type Heat recovery steam generator. It consists of three nos. of boiler feed water pumps and one no. of forced draft fan. It is a DCS operated boiler. (MR- 13052)

c. **APU BOILER**

One no. of 90T/Hr, 12Kg/cm2 THERMAX make gas fired bi drum water tube type boiler. It consists of two nos. of boiler feed water pumps and one no. forced draft fan. DCS Operated. (MR-15553)

d **COGEN DA/DM PLANT**

It consists of two trains of 57.5 M3/Hr capacity each for DA water and one train of DM water of 9.0 M3/Hr capacity.

e. **APU DM Plant**

Consisting of one train of 75 Tons / Hr Capacity.

f **HRSG-IV**-One new HRSG Boiler of 60 T/Hr BHEL make water tube type Heat recovery steam generator is likely to be commissioned in next 12 Months. Its operation will also fall in ambit of this contract.